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Summary
Pakistan is a strategically important country and home to one of the world’s
largest Muslim populations.  In October 1999, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen.
Pervez Musharraf replaced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup.
Following the military overthrow of an elected government, Islamabad faced
considerable international opprobrium and was subjected to automatic coup-related
U.S. sanctions.  The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and
Musharraf’s ensuing withdrawal of support for the Afghan Taliban regime, however,
had the effect of greatly reducing Pakistan’s international isolation.  Congress
temporarily removed restrictions, and large-scale U.S. aid to the country resumed, in
late 2001.  The United States views Pakistan as a vital ally in the international anti-
terrorism coalition.  The Bush Administration refrains from expressing any
significant public criticisms of Pakistan’s internal political practices, while still
asserting that the strengthening of civilian political institutions in Islamabad is “a
requirement for the development of a stable, moderate Islamic state.”  
While top-tier U.S. emphases in the region after September 2001 remain
combating religious extremism and ending illicit weapons proliferation, the United
States expresses a strong interest in the improvement of Pakistan’s human rights
situation, especially as regards the restoration and strengthening of democratic
institutions.  There is a debate among analysts over the exigency of this issue.  Some
observers urge patience, contending that a “true” democratic system will require time
and that “military-guided” governance is required in an unstable setting and to deter
extremist political influences.  Others argue that Pakistan’s underdeveloped
democracy and rule of law are themselves a central cause of the country’s instability.
October 2002 general elections nominally fulfilled President Musharraf’s
promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved after his extra-
constitutional seizure of power.  A pro-military alliance won a plurality of seats while
a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing.  Yet subsequent
developments — including an agreement between Musharraf and the Islamist
opposition to bring controversial constitutional changes before Parliament, a broken
promise from Musharraf to resign his military commission before 2005, and
widespread accusations of rigging in August 2005 municipal elections — have fueled
concerns that Pakistan’s civilian democratic institutions are being weakened.
National and provincial level elections are to take place in 2007.
The 9/11 Commission Report called Musharraf’s government the “best hope”
for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and recommended the provision of long-
term and comprehensive support to Pakistan so long as its government remains
committed to combating extremism and to a policy of “enlightened moderation.”  In
passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458), Congress broadly endorsed this recommendation and sought to encourage
Pakistan’s transition to full democracy.  The act also extended the President’s
authority to waive coup-related sanctions on Pakistan through FY2006.  See also
CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations and CRS Report RL32259,
Terrorism in South Asia.  This report will be updated periodically.
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Most Recent Developments
In August 2005, Pakistan held two-phase municipal-level elections in 110
districts.  Although the exercise ostensibly was a non-party affair, officials from the
opposition Pakistan People’s Party complained in July that President Musharraf was
violating the code of conduct by urging voters to cast ballots for candidates favored
by the ruling Pakistan Muslim League.  Then, in a blow to the hopes of Islamist
sympathizers, the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled that candidates with religious
education were ineligible to run in municipal elections unless they have studied
English, Pakistan studies, and Urdu.  Islamist leaders criticized the ruling.1  During
the polling, tens of thousands of troops were deployed for security purposes, yet
scores of Pakistanis were killed and as many as 1,000 were injured in poll-related
violence around the country.  Claims of widespread vote-rigging and women being
barred from polling stations in the Frontier Province spurred Pakistan’s major
opposition parties — both secular and Islamist — to issue a joint call for a national
strike to protest President Musharraf’s “military takeover,” “dictatorial behavior,”
and “blatant rigging.”  Ensuing protests were only moderate in scale (with Quetta
being an exception) and Information Minister Rashid called the strike “a total
failure.”2
Candidates favored by Pakistan’s ruling party appear to have fared quite well
in all four provinces, and Muslim League gains were seen as a major boost for
President Musharraf, who may have to rely on the ruling party to win the presidency
in 2007.  Musharraf expressed satisfaction with “a victory for the moderates” and “a
defeat for the extremists.”  However, one Pakistani analyst opined that the outcome
would be unlikely to yield political harmony and had only exacerbated the sense of
bitterness and alienation felt among opposition parties.  Others warn that apparent
irregularities could in fact harm Musharraf’s image; a former Pakistani ambassador
called the process a “typically vice-regal electoral exercise.”  Still, many non-
Pakistani observers, especially those from international aid organizations such as the
Asian Development Bank, see the local governance system as a bright spot in
otherwise faltering efforts at Pakistani democratization.3
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In June 2005, the U.S. State Department’s lead official for South Asia, Christina
Rocca, reiterated for the House International Relations Committee the important role
Pakistan continues to play in assisting U.S.-led efforts to defeat terrorism, stabilize
neighboring Afghanistan, and end the transfer of nuclear weapons material and
technologies.  She noted that “Pakistan’s government has taken steps necessary ... to
set it on the path of becoming a modern, prosperous, and democratic state,” but
conceded “there’s still a way to go” toward that goal.  Calling democratization a
“central focus” and one of the “top priorities” in U.S.-Pakistan relations, Secretary
Rocca expressed a U.S. expectation that Pakistan’s 2005 local and 2007 general
elections “be free and fair throughout the entire process. ... [W]e believe that
democracy, freedom, and rule of law are the best counters to hatred, extremism, and
terrorism” (the State Department did not comment on ensuing reports of irregularities
in the August 2005 elections).  Some Members in attendance expressed skepticism
about Pakistan’s democratization under Musharraf, with one calling the country a
“poster child for the President’s forward strategy of freedom.”4
On the political front, Pakistan’s moderate, secular parties continued to face
governmental repression.  In April, in an effort to block a rally planned to welcome
the return to Lahore of Asif Zardari, the husband of former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto, police arrested thousands of activists of the opposition Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP) and some senior party leaders, and blocked travel routes around the city.
When Zardari arrived in Lahore, he was placed in “protective custody” by authorities
(PPP members said he had been arrested).  New York-based Human Rights Watch
later appealed to the Pakistani government to release the “thousands” of opposition
PPP supporters who had been arrested in nation-wide sweeps.5  
Meanwhile, the Islamist political coalition saw thousands of their supporters
arrested during large street protests and strikes against the Musharraf government;
tens of thousands rallied in Karachi and Lahore in late March.  Religious parties and
others in Pakistan also were disturbed by a May story in Newsweek magazine report
alleging that a copy of the Koran had been desecrated at the U.S. facility at
Guantanamo Bay.  The Islamabad government expressed “serious concern” to U.S.
officials about the allegations and the U.S. State Department called any such
desecration “deplorable and entirely inconsistent with American values of religious
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freedom and tolerance.”  Pakistan’s National Assembly passed a resolution
condemning the alleged desecration.6
U.S. Interests and Policy Discussion
U.S. Interests  
U.S. Policy.  Pakistan, a strategically important country that is home to one of
the world’s largest Muslim populations, has been a key cooperating nation in U.S.-
led counterterrorism efforts in South Asia.7  On October 12, 1999, Pakistan’s Chief
of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Pervez Musharraf replaced Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif in a bloodless coup.  In the wake of the military overthrow of the elected
government, Islamabad faced considerable international opprobrium and was
subjected to automatic coup-related U.S. sanctions under section 508 of the annual
foreign assistance appropriations act.  The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States and Musharraf’s ensuing withdrawal of support for the Afghan Taliban
regime, however, had the effect of greatly reducing Pakistan’s international isolation.
Congress temporarily removed restrictions, and large-scale U.S. aid to the country
resumed, in the final months of 2001 (coup-related sanctions are still in place; since
March 2003 President Bush has exercised annually the one-year waiver authority on
coup-related sanctions granted to him by Congress).
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 characterized
Pakistan as one of the most important U.S. partners in the war on terrorism.  While
top-tier U.S. emphases in  the region after September 2001 have remained combating
religious extremism and ending illicit nuclear weapons proliferation, the United
States expresses a strong interest in the improvement of Pakistan’s human rights
situation, especially as regards the restoration and strengthening of the country’s
civilian democratic institutions.  There exists a debate among analysts over the
exigency of this issue. Some observers urge patience, contending that a “true”
democratic system will require time and that “military-guided” governance is
required in an unstable setting and to deter extremist political influences.  Others
argue that Pakistan’s underdeveloped democracy and rule of law are themselves a
central cause of the country’s instability.  Some believe that Pakistan’s Islamist
forces are manipulated by and at times in collusion with the military as it manages
skewed civil-military relations wherein moderate political parties play a decreasing
role.  A number of top U.S. diplomats, along with many in Congress, have called for
more and accelerated development of Pakistani democracy.  Some sections of
legislation passed by the 108th Congress addressed this concern and pending
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legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 12) contains Pakistan-specific language
regarding that country’s governmental system.
The United States now considers Pakistan to be a vital ally in the international
anti-terrorism coalition.  The Bush Administration has refrained from expressing any
strong public criticisms of Pakistan’s internal political practices, while still asserting
that the strengthening of civilian political institutions in Islamabad is “a requirement
for the development of a stable, moderate Islamic state.”  The State Department and
the U.S. Agency for International Development have identified “democratic stability
in South Asia’s frontline states” of Pakistan and Afghanistan as one of eleven key
democracy and human rights-related initiatives for the world in FY2006.8  According
to U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Nancy Powell in August 2004,
America wants to see strong Pakistani democratic institutions and practices,
including a National Assembly, Senate, and Provincial Assemblies that play a
vigorous and positive role in governance and an independent judiciary that
promotes the rule of law.  We also would like to see Pakistan’s civil society play
an active role in governance.9
In March 2005, while unveiling the Bush Administration’s “new strategy for South
Asia,” an unnamed senior State Department official said,
The goal, then, has to be a fully democratic, economically promising Pakistan
that feels secure and is thus at peace with its neighbors, with the previously high
tide of anti-Americanism and Islamist extremism gradually receding.10
Since becoming Secretary of State in early 2005, Condoleezza Rice has made several
statements about Pakistan’s governance system, offering that trends in Pakistan were
moving that country “in the right direction,” and insisting that the United States “will
continue to press toward eventual elections and a full democratic process in
Pakistan.”  During the lead-up to Pakistan’s August 2005 municipal elections,
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Rocca told an interviewer, “A level
playing field for [Pakistan’s] local body elections, as well as for the election in 2007,
is critical for the elections to be free and fair” (the State Department did not comment
on ensuing reports of irregularities in the August 2005 elections).11
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The 9/11 Commission Report and Congressional Action.  The 9/11
Commission Report (released in July 2004) claims that — even after acknowledging
problems in U.S.-Pakistan relations and President Musharraf’s role in them —
“Musharraf’s government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”
In addition to identifying Pakistan as a principal transit country for the 9/11 hijackers
and naming the western regions of the country as one of six “actual or potential
terrorist sanctuaries” worldwide, the Commission offers a key recommendation for
U.S. policy toward Pakistan:
If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the
life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hard choices too,
and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan.
Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support
Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive
effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as
Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own.12
In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458), the 108th Congress broadly endorsed this recommendation by calling for long-
term and comprehensive U.S. support for the government of Pakistan in an effort to
ensure a “stable and secure future” for that country.  The act expresses the “sense of
Congress” that U.S. assistance should in particular encourage and enable Pakistan to
make progress in eight specific areas, one of which is “becoming a more effective
and participatory democracy.”  
Congressional attention to Pakistan’s domestic political developments is
ongoing.  In June 2005 (S.Rept. 109-96), the Senate Appropriations Committee
recommended approval of the Administration’s request for FY2006 aid to Pakistan
while expressing concern with “the slow pace of the democratic development of
Pakistan” and an expectation that the State Department and USAID “continue to
make democracy and governance programs a priority.”  Weeks later, the House
passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2006 and FY2007 (H.R. 2601),
which includes a provision requiring the President to report to Congress on the extent
to which a “fully functional democracy” has been restored in Pakistan.  The Senate-
passed version of the Foreign Operations FY2006 Appropriations bill (H.R. 3057)
would require the Secretary of State report to Congress on steps taken by Pakistan to
protect the rights and safety of Pakistani human rights lawyers and journalists.
Pending legislation in the 109th Congress (the Targeting Terrorists More Effectively
Act of 2005, S. 12) includes Pakistan-specific language regarding “a number of
critical issues that threaten to disrupt” U.S.-Pakistan relations.  Government
institutions, democracy, and rule of law are among these.
“Enlightened Moderation”.  The concept of “enlightened moderation,” as
expounded by Musharraf himself, is a direct response to a growing world perception
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that Islam is linked to fundamentalism, and thus to extremism, and thus to terrorism.
It is a strategy meant to both shun the militancy that is rooted in “political injustice,
denial, and deprivation,”and to bring “socioeconomic uplift”in the Muslim world.
Musharraf has called upon Muslims to “adopt a path of moderation and a conciliatory
approach to fight the common belief that Islam is a religion of militancy in conflict
with modernization, democracy and secularism.”  Pakistan’s prime minister, Shaukat
Aziz, a close ally of Musharraf and his finance minister since 1999, took office in
August 2004 vowing to pursue a policy of “enlightened moderation.”13  Many
Pakistanis appear to welcome the approach and see religious extremists as the main
obstacle.  However, one maverick Islamabad politician takes the view that
Musharraf’s tack was born of expediency, not conviction, and only serves to
strengthen the perception that neither he nor the United States have a genuine interest
in Pakistani democracy.14  The Bush Administration rejects criticism that it is overly
focused on the person of Musharraf and has called the Pakistani president “the right
man in the right place at the right time for the right job.”15
Policy Discussion
U.S. interest in Pakistani democratization exists in tandem (some would say in
conflict) with the perceived need to have a stable and effectively-administered front-
line ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition.  While many observers believe
that U.S. interests in combating terrorism and weapons proliferation in South Asia
entail a “trade-off” with regard to other concerns, some contend that the human rights
situation in Pakistan may itself be a crucial aspect of the incidence of terrorism and
religious extremism.16  Congressional oversight of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a March
2003 hearing included Member expressions of concern about problems with
Pakistani democratization and the danger of the United States “giving full
recognition to a military takeover” through continuous waivers of coup-related aid
restrictions.17  Pakistan’s military continues to dominate the country’s centralized
decision-making process, and, while in office, Prime Minister Jamali referred to
President Musharraf as being his “boss.”18
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18, 2003.  In April 2005, President Musharraf told a Quetta audience that “the Army is in
the barracks and has no role in politics.”  An opposition party parliamentarian later disputed
the claim, saying that 831 military officers were employed by federal and provincial
government departments (“Deterrence Strategy in Place: Musharraf,” Dawn (Karachi), Apr.
3, 2005; “Musharraf’s Claim Disputed,” Dawn (Karachi), Apr. 4, 2005).
19 Hasan Askari-Rizvi quoted in “Kiss My Vardi,” Herald (Karachi), Oct. 2004.
20 “Pakistan: Four Years After Coup, Rights Abuses Abound,” Human Rights Watch, Oct.
10, 2003; Paul Watson, “A Delicate Balance of Rule for Pakistan’s Musharraf,” Los Angeles
Times, Mar. 5, 2004; “Pakistan,” Amnesty International  Report 2004, May 2004.
21 Stephen P. Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly, Summer
2003; Ejaz Haider, “CMAG’s Decision Is Right,” Friday Times (Lahore), Oct. 3, 2003.
22 See, for example, Sherry Rehman, “Enigma of the Defense Budget,” Dawn (Karachi),
June 16, 2005.
23 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Sustainable Democracy,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 24, 2004;
David Rohde and Salman Masood, “Many See Musharraf Keeping Army Post to Cement
Power,” New York Times, Sep. 18, 2004.
24 Sumit Ganguly, “The ‘Best Hope’ in South Asia,” Hindu (Madras), Aug. 13, 2004; Paula
Newberg, “As U.S. Talks of Liberty, Musharraf Scorns It,” Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2004.
The military appears to have increased its control over Pakistan; as articulated
by a Pakistani authority on civil-military relations, “The corporate interests of the
military have expanded so much under General Musharraf that the army is now
overwhelming all the major sectors of the state, the economy, and the society.”19
Military agencies are blamed for abusing human rights and some critics have
suggested that Musharraf’s “Faustian bargain” with Islamists serves to strengthen the
very extremism that he publicly opposes.20  One senior Western observer contends
that “the generals cannot govern Pakistan, but they will not let anyone else govern it;”
a Pakistani commentator sees the problem as “a military that wants to control things
without being overtly seen to be doing so.”21  Although a civilian Parliament has been
seated for three years, most of Islamabad’s policy making process is opaque; an
absence of transparency may be most noticeable with Pakistan’s defense budget,
which appears as a single line in the federal budget.  Numerous opposition figures
have complained that removing the details of military spending from public scrutiny
is nondemocratic and allows the country’s intelligence services, in particular, to
remain unaccountable to the people.22
Although it is possible to argue that Pakistan is more democratic since October
2002 elections, many analysts  note that the country’s democratic institutions and
processes are inflexible and unaccommodating of dissent, and they see Pakistan’s
political parties seriously weakened in recent years, with the military’s influence
correspondingly more profound.23  Moreover, numerous commentators reject the 9/11
Commission’s “best hope” label for Musharraf himself as myopic and repetitive of
past U.S. reliance on Pakistani military regimes, especially in light of signs that
Pakistan’s seemingly decreasing political stability is rooted in Musharraf’s policies
and in his patronage by the United States.24 
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The perceived U.S. need for a stable and reliable regional ally in its ongoing
counterterrorism efforts in South Asia have some analysts concluding that Musharraf
remains in a position to take further domestic political advantage of current
geopolitical dynamics.  Yet, at a July 2004 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, there appeared to be consensus among the panel of three veteran Pakistan
watchers about the potential problems inherent in a real or perceived U.S. over-
reliance on the individual of Musharraf at the potential cost of more positive
development of Pakistan’s democratic institutions and civil society.  Many
commentators believe such development is key to the long-term success of stated
U.S. policy in the region. Calling Musharraf a “marginal satisfier” who will do only
the minimum expected of him, one hearing witness recommended that, “The United
States must alter the impression our support for Pakistan is essentially support for
Musharraf.”25  This conception is echoed by a Pakistani analyst, who contends that
all of Musharraf’s major policy shifts after September 2001 have come through
compulsion by external pressure or events and that, while the direction of Pakistan’s
policy change has been appropriate, “the momentum of change is too slow and
awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass.”26  Many Pakistani
and Western commentators insist that only by allowing the country’s secular political
parties fully into the system can the country realize stable and enduring democracy.27
In June 2005 statements before a House panel, one senior U.S. scholar warned
Congress about Pakistan’s “dysfunctional social order, its dangerous sectarianism
and its distorted political system,” saying the country has achieved “sustainable
failure.”  When asked by members of the House International Relations Committee
about the country’s governance system, this expert opined that Pakistan’s military has
sought to “prevent any of the mainstream parties from emerging as an alternative to
the military.”  Yet he finds this strategy harmful to the military’s own interests,
viewing the army as demonstrably unable to effectively govern a progressively
deteriorating Pakistani system.  Thus, “it’s in the army’s own interest that it retreats
from politics [and] allow moderate, centrist parties to fill the space.”  He called
Sharif’s and Bhutto’s return from exile a requirement for truly free elections in 2007.
However, the Musharraf government has indicated that the two former Prime
Ministers  would not be allowed to return to Pakistan before the 2007 elections.28
Numerous American policymakers believe that U.S. interests are for the time
being best served by the presence of a strong and secure Islamabad leadership.  Thus,
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while early optimism about Musharraf’s potential as a reformer has waned
considerably, there are those who still conclude that the existence of an unstable and
possibly Islamicized or failed state between Afghanistan and India — a state in
possession of nuclear weapons — is a far less desirable circumstance than the present
one in which a powerful and secular military institution maintains a reasonable
degree of order in Pakistan.29  For some, this argument has become less persuasive
as the country’s law-and-order situation appeared to deteriorate in 2004-2005 and
uncertainty about political succession in Islamabad causes trepidation in numerous
world capitals.  Pakistan’s fragile democratic institutions are under continuous threat
emanating from the authoritarian influences of the country’s powerful military and
quasi-feudal economic structures.  Given a stated U.S. position that, “Democratic
institutions are required if Pakistan is to thrive economically and to develop further
into an enlightened and moderate Muslim state,”30 Pakistan’s domestic political
developments likely will be closely monitored by the United States.
Political Setting
Background
The history of democracy in Pakistan is a troubled one marked by ongoing
tripartite power struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs.
Military regimes have ruled Pakistan for more than half of the country’s 57 years in
existence, and most observers agree that Pakistan has no sustained history of
effective constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy.  The country has had five
constitutions, the most recent being ratified in 1973 (and significantly modified
several times since).  From the earliest days of independence, the country’s armed
forces have thought of themselves as “saviors of the nation,” a perception that has
received significant, though limited, public support.  The military, usually acting in
tandem with the president, has engaged in three outright seizures of power from
civilian-led governments:  Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, and
Gen. Musharraf in 1999.31  Since 1970, five successive governments have been voted
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National Alliance opposed to him, Army Chief Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, in apparent collusion with
conservative Islamic groups, declared martial law, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the
National Assembly, and took power in a bloodless coup.  He vowed to hold national
elections within 90 days, but soon rescinded that promise, and spent the next 11 years
making changes to the Pakistani constitution and system of governance that would ensure
his continued hold on power.  Only two of the three coups d’état (Zia in 1977 and Musharraf
in 1999) were entirely extra-constitutional in nature.  See Robert Stern, Democracy and
Dictatorship in South Asia (Praeger, 2001).
32 International Foundation for Election Systems, “National Public Opinion Survey Pakistan
2004,” available at [http://www.plsc.org.pk/survey/index.htm].
33 See [http://www.ppp.org.pk].
into power, but not a single time has a government been voted out of power — all
five were removed by the army through explicit or implicit presidential orders.  Of
Pakistan’s three most prominent prime ministers, one (Z.A. Bhutto) was executed,
another (Benazir Bhutto) exiled and her husband jailed on corruption charges, and
the last (Nawaz Sharif) remains in exile under threat of life in prison for similar
abuses should he return.  Such long-standing turmoil in the governance system may
partially explain why, in a 2004 public opinion survey, nearly two-thirds of
Pakistanis were unable to provide a meaning for the term “democracy.”32
Major Political Parties and Coalitions
Pakistan Muslim League.  The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) is the
country’s oldest political party and was the only major party existing at the time of
independence.  Long associated with the Quaid-e-Azam (Father of the Nation)
Muhammed Ali Jinnah and his lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, the PML was weakened
upon their premature deaths in 1948 and 1951 (Jinnah by natural causes, Khan by
assassination).  Not until the 1988 elections — when Nawaz Sharif, who had been
Gen. Zia’s finance minister, led a PML-Islamist coalition to a strong second-place
showing and became Punjab chief minister — was the party again to be a player on
the national scene.  Sharif was elected prime minister in 1990 and, three years later,
established the offshoot PML-Nawaz (PML-N), which went on to dominate the 1997
elections.  In the lead up to the 2002 elections, most former (but still influential)
Sharif loyalists joined the new PML-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), a group seen to enjoy
overt support from the military.  In May 2004, five PML factions united and named
Punjabi politician and industrialist Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as their leader.  Nawaz
Sharif and most of his immediate family live in exile in Saudi Arabia.  His family’s
legal status is unclear, but reports indicate that, shortly after the 1999 coup, the Sharif
family and the Musharraf government concluded an “arrangement” that would bar
any family member from returning to Pakistan for a period of ten years.  The PML’s
electoral strength typically is found in the densely populated Punjab province.
Pakistan People’s Party.  The left-leaning Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
was established in 1967 in reaction to the military dictatorship of Gen. Ayub Khan.33
The party slogan was and remains “Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our Polity,
Socialism is our Economy.”  Under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had
resigned his position as Khan’s foreign minister, the PPP won a majority of West
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Pakistan’s assembly seats in 1970 elections and held power from 1971 until 1977,
when Bhutto’s government was overthrown by his army chief, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq.
Bhutto, who oversaw the establishment of a parliamentary system with the 1973
Constitution and who launched Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, was executed
by the military government in 1979.  When Zia’s ban on political parties was lifted
in 1986, Bhutto’s daughter Benazir emerged as the PPP leader and won the prime
ministership in 1988 and again in 1993.  Today, she lives in exile in London and
Dubai under threat of imprisonment should she return to Pakistan (she has thrice
been convicted of corruption in absentia).  In an effort to skirt legal barriers to its
electoral participation in 2002, the PPP formed a separate entity, the PPP
Parliamentarians (PPPP), that pledged to uphold Bhutto’s political philosophy.  This
group is headed by Makhdoom Amin Fahim.  The PPP historically has done
especially well in the southern Sind province.
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Front).  The Muttahida Majlis-e-
Amal (MMA or United Action Forum) is a loose coalition of six Islamist parties
formed for the 2002 elections.34  Its largest constituent is the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI),
founded by Maulana Maududi in 1941 and considered to be Pakistan’s best-
organized religious party.  JI chief Qazi Hussein Ahmed serves as MMA president.
Another long-standing Islamist party is the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam faction led by
Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F).  The JUI is associated with religious schools that
gave rise to the Afghan Taliban movement.  In addition to promoting a central role
for religion in Pakistani affairs, Islamists have been opposed to Westernization in
both its capitalist and socialist forms.  Although Pakistan’s religious parties enjoy
considerable “street” power and were strengthened by Zia’s policies of the 1980s,
their electoral showing has in the past been quite limited (they won only two
parliamentary seats in the 1993 and 1997 elections).
Notable Leaders of Pakistan
Governor-General Mohammed Ali Jinnah 1947-1948
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan 1947-1951
President Iskandar Ali Mirza 1955-1958
President-General Mohammed Ayub Khan 1958-1969
President-General Mohammed Yahya Khan 1969-1971
President-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 1971-1977
President-General Zia ul-Haq 1978-1988
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto 1988-1990
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 1990-1993
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto 1993-1996
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 1997-1999
President-General Pervez Musharraf 1999-
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Major Developments Under Musharraf
Military Rule and Assumption of the Presidency
On October 12, 1999, Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf overthrew the elected
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, dismissed the National Assembly, and
appointed himself “Chief Executive.”   The proximate cause of Musharraf’s action
appears to have been Sharif’s attempt to remove him from his Army leadership
position and prevent his return from abroad, but widespread dissatisfaction with
Sharif’s authoritarian and allegedly corrupt regime — both within the Pakistani
military and among the general public — are believed to have been important broader
factors.  Under a “Provisional Constitution Order” (PCO), Musharraf declared a state
of emergency, suspended the Constitution, and, by special decree, ensured that his
actions could not be challenged by any court.  He promised to end corruption and
revive “genuine democracy.”  In January 2000, members of Pakistan’s Supreme
Court were required to take an oath promising to uphold the PCO; six jurists,
including the Chief Justice, refused and stood retired.  Five months later, the new
Supreme Court issued a sweeping validation of Musharraf’s actions, including the
PCO and the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies, but it also ordered
that elections to reseat these bodies be held no later than three years from the date of
the coup (i.e., by October 12, 2002).  These developments left Pakistan with a
“seemingly benign, but nonetheless very real, military dictatorship.”35
General Musharraf’s October 1999 seizure of power initially was met with
widespread approval among the Pakistani people, many of whom considered the
Sharif government to be incorrigibly corrupt.  Even many of the country’s more
liberal-minded opinion-makers acquiesced with the hope that Musharraf might
succeed in improving Pakistan’s lot where civilian-led governments had failed,
and/or because they believed that a military-led government was the only remaining
alternative to a radical Islamic regime in Islamabad.36  Yet Musharraf’s subsequent
actions became widely interpreted as indicating his intention to impose a more or less
permanent authoritarian rule over the country, and they thus alienated many of the
early optimists.  While maintaining his promise to hold national elections in October
2002, Musharraf spent ensuing years taking actions that bolstered his ruling position
and that of the military.  Proponents of Musharraf’s political choices since 1999 insist
that the country is becoming more stable, and less corrupt and personality-centered
through “military-guided” administration.37
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In June 2001, President Mohammad Rafiq Tarar was forced to resign under the
PCO and was replaced by Gen. Musharraf.  Musharraf later sought to legitimize his
status as president with an April 2002 referendum.  Islamabad reported resounding
public approval for Musharraf’s continued rule in the results of this exercise, with
98% of votes cast in favor.  Yet opposition parties had boycotted the vote, and
charges of widespread coercion and fraud marred the outcome.  Musharraf later
apologized for “irregularities” in the process.38
Constitutional Changes
In August 2002, President Musharraf took unilateral action in announcing a
“Legal Framework Order” (LFO) of constitutional changes.  The most important of
these provide greatly enhanced powers to the Pakistani President.  Musharraf
maintained that the amendments were necessary to bring “true” and stable
democracy to the country.  Critics contended that Musharraf (who retained his
position as Army Chief) was seeking to legitimize the military’s extra-constitutional
role in governance, as well as ensure his own continued power in contravention of
democratic principles.  The key constitutional change was a provision allowing the
President to dismiss the National Assembly.39  Other controversial clauses called for
presidential appointments of military chiefs and creation of a military-dominated
National Security Council (NSC) authorized to oversee the country’s security
policies, as well as monitor the process of democracy and governance in the
country.40  Many saw the NSC providing Pakistan’s armed forces with a permanent
and unprecedented institutional role in the country’s governance.  Pakistan’s major
opposition parties decried Musharraf’s action as illegal, claiming that only Parliament
has the power to amend the constitution.   For numerous critics, the proposed changes
harked back to Zia-ul-Haq’s continuous and years-long efforts to avoid any form of
electoral or judicial challenge to his rule.  In response to Musharraf’s LFO
announcement, the United States indicated that full U.S. support for the Pakistani
President would continue, even if some of the changes “could make it more difficult
to build strong, democratic institutions in Pakistan.”41
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43 Election figures come from the Associated Press of Pakistan, a government news service.
44 The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) is a Sindhi regional party mainly composed of
the descendants of pre-partition immigrants (Muhajirs) from what is now India.  Although
it did well in Sind’s provincial elections, the MQM collected only a small percentage of the
national vote (winning 17 national seats). The nationalist and formerly powerful Awami
National Party was shut out at the national level and did poorly in the NWFP, its traditional
provincial stronghold.  Small parties and independents accounted for the remaining 31 seats.
The 2002 National Election
Following the October 1999 coup, the Pakistani Supreme Court ordered that
national elections be held within a period of no more than three years, and President
Musharraf set and held to a poll date of October 10, 2002.  Given the country’s poor
historical record with democratic processes, many observers lauded Musharraf for
the mere act of holding elections as promised.  However, and despite the
government’s insistence that the exercise was free and fair, opposition parties and
numerous independent observers called the election deeply flawed.  Widely asserted
was that the military regime’s machinations substantively weakened the main secular
opposition parties.42  Voter turnout was estimated by the Pakistan Election
Commission to have been above 40%, but still lower than any previous Pakistani
national election.  Major parties offer even lower estimates, with most falling
between 20% and 30%.
The PML-Q — also called the “king’s party” due to its perceived pro-military
bent — won 118 of the total 342 parliamentary seats, almost all of them from Punjab,
and the affiliated National Alliance won 16 more.43  This number gave the pro-
Musharraf parties a plurality in the National Assembly, but fell well short of the
majority representation needed to control the body outright.  The PPP won the largest
number of votes overall, but Pakistan’s electoral rules awarded it runner-up status
only, with a total of 81 national seats.  Perhaps the most surprising outcome of the
elections was the strong third-place showing of the MMA Islamist coalition that now
controls the provincial assembly of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and
leads a coalition in that of Baluchistan, as well as seating 68 legislators in the
National Assembly (up from two previously) — about 20% of the total.44
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Coalition-Building and Deadlock  
The new National Assembly sat in November 2002.  The three leading national
parties — the PML-Q, PPP, and MMA — had engaged in convoluted and ultimately
failed coalition-building negotiations.  Both the secular opposition PPP and the
Islamist parties maintained a strident rejection of the Legal Framework Order
changes to the Constitution.  A PPP-Islamist alliance would have set the pro-military
parties in opposition, a possibility that reportedly sent the Musharraf regime into
“panic.”45  Signals that a PML-Q-Islamist alliance was in the offing ended when
President Musharraf refused to accept MMA demands that he resign his position as
Army Chief.  Some political analysts opined that an outcome in which no party
secured a majority served President Musharraf’s interests by allowing him to retain
preeminent power, and such an outcome may well have been his intent.46
In an unexpected circumstance, the pro-Musharraf parties succeeded in forming
a thin working coalition without the participation of either the PPP or the MMA, a
development made possible by the defection of several PPP members, some of whom
were rewarded with high-profile ministerships of their own.  (This group of PPP
“Patriots” has continued to be strongly pro-Musharraf.)  In November 2002, PML-Q
favorite and former Baluchistan Chief Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali was elected to
serve as Prime Minister.47  Speculation abounded over whether or not the Pakistani
President intended for the Islamist coalition to make as strong a showing as it did;
Benazir Bhutto, for one, suggested that Musharraf “handed over the areas bordering
Afghanistan to religious parties” in an effort to ensure continued U.S. support while
simultaneously placating domestic opponents.48  Although a full National Assembly
was seated, the body remained stalled on procedural issues for more than one year;
only a single piece of legislation (a budget) was passed in that time.  In July 2003,
more than 20 groups representing nearly all of Pakistan’s non-Islamist opposition
parties issued a joint rejection of the LFO and called for Musharraf’s resignation.
Shortly after, the MMA announced its “final” refusal to accept the LFO and
Musharraf’s status as Army Chief.49
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54 Musharraf even suggested that, by failing to sit at the NSC meeting, the MMA was
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Musharraf-MMA Accommodation  
The fractious 14-month-long dispute between President Musharraf’s allies and
opposition parties in the National Assembly came to an end with a surprise December
2003 deal between Musharraf and the Islamist MMA.  Under the arrangement,
Musharraf pledged to resign his military commission by the end of 2004.  He also
agreed to put a slightly altered version of the LFO before Parliament.  It was passed
and, on the final day of 2003, became the 17th Amendment to the Constitution.50
Finally, Musharraf submitted to a vote of confidence by Pakistan’s Electoral College
(comprised of the membership of all national and provincial legislatures).  On
January 1, 2004, Musharraf’s presidency through 2007 was legitimized when he won
about 60% of the total vote.51  Officials in Islamabad contended that the
developments augured well for Pakistani democracy and stability, but non-Islamist
opposition parties unified under the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy
(ARD) accused the MMA of betrayal and insisted that the new arrangement merely
institutionalized military rule in Pakistan.52
Creation of a National Security Council
When the 17th Amendment to the Constitution was passed in December 2003, one
of the key changes to President Musharraf’s original August 2002 LFO proposal was the
removal of the National Security Council.  In something of a concession, Musharraf and
the military allowed the NSC to be created through a legislative rather than constitutional
process, meaning that Parliament will have at least nominal power to alter or dissolve the
body.  Draft legislation was completed in January 2004.  Secular and Islamist opposition
parties vowed to oppose the bill, saying an NSC would curtail Parliament’s powers, but
their vehement protest failed to sway the ruling party and they boycotted voting when the
bill passed in April.  The first formal meeting of the NSC took place in June and focused
on Pakistan’s deteriorating law-and-order situation.53  Notably absent was Maulana
Fazlur Rehman, whose status as Leader of the Opposition provides an NSC seat.
Musharraf reportedly was unhappy with the Islamist’s boycotting of the inaugural
session.54  Musharraf and his supporters in Parliament insist that the NSC will reduce the
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reneging on an agreement, but MMA leaders have continued to boycott the body to date
(“President Musharraf Chairs Inaugural Session of National Security Council,” Pakistan
Press International, June 24, 2004; “President Chairs NSC Meeting,” Daily Times (Lahore),
Sep. 9, 2005).
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likelihood of future military coups by providing a “safety valve” — a forum in which the
army can play a role short of dissolving the National Assembly.  Opponents still contend
that a military-dominated body headed by the President will only undercut the already
tenuous power of Parliament.55
Marginalization of the Non-Islamist Opposition
The Pakistani military and intelligence services have a long history of involving
themselves in and even manipulating their country’s political system, oftentimes to
the benefit of Islamist forces and at significant cost to more moderate, secular
interests.56 Pakistan’s non-Islamist parties unified under the Alliance for the
Restoration of Democracy consider themselves to be the country’s “true” opposition,
given past MMA accommodation with the ruling party.  People’s Party leaders and
loyalists of Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N warn the United States that military dictators are
not reliable over time and that Pakistan’s civilian political forces may soon become
so marginalized as to become ineffective.57  The October 2003 arrest of opposition
political figure Makhdoom Javed Hashmi spurred some to identify renewed
governmental repression.  Hashmi, leader of the ARD, was jailed after he publicized
a letter allegedly written by an army officer criticizing President Musharraf’s policies.
In April 2004, Hashmi was sentenced 23 years in prison for sedition, mutiny, and
forgery.  The United States expressed regret at the “closed nature of the proceedings”
against Hashmi and called on Pakistan to administer justice fairly and in a transparent
manner in his case.  Islamabad responded by accusing the United States of
“unwarranted and misplaced” interference in its internal affairs.58
In May 2004, Shabaz Sharif, a former Punjab Chief Minister and the brother of
deposed PM Nawaz Sharif, attempted to return to Pakistan from exile, but was
“dragged away by commandos” and deported to Saudi Arabia after less than two
hours in Lahore in what some termed a “massive over-reaction” by authorities.
Police arrested as many as 2,200 supporters from Sharif’s PML-N party who had
gathered to welcome him.  The events were widely viewed as indicating that the
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military intends to maintain its hold on civil society.59  Furthermore, the May
elevation of Jamiat-Ulema-Islami chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman to the position of
Leader of the Opposition in Parliament spurred commentary that the “mullah-military
alliance” had become a “Musharraf-Maulana alliance,” further marginalizing
Pakistan’s more secular opposition parties.60  There also are reports of other more
subtle forms of harassment and suppression of opposition political figures.61
Late 2004 saw reports that President Musharraf and the Pakistan Muslim League
were preparing the ground for a reconciliation with the country’s non-Islamist
opposition.  In November 2004, Asif Zardari — the husband of former PM Benazir
Bhutto and political figure in his own right who had been imprisoned for eight years
without conviction — was released on bail after a Supreme Court ruling.  Zardari,
who still faces legal action in eight pending criminal cases, later received permission
to leave the country to visit his wife.  The developments fueled talk of a pending deal
between Musharraf and the PPP.  Information beyond rumor was sparse, but there
have been reliable reports of ongoing communication between government officials
and the top leadership of both the PPP and the PML-N, contacts that many believed
were preliminary efforts at “deal-making.”62
A major development came with the February 2005 meeting in Saudi Arabia of
former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto.  The two top opposition
leaders, both living in exile, are longtime rivals, but appear to have set aside their
differences in the interest of establishing a “minimum program for the restoration of
democracy” in Pakistan.  Both parties vowed to work together to achieve this “sacred
goal.”  Bhutto was accompanied to the meeting by her husband, Asif Zardari.  Some
analysts saw Zardari’s release from prison in November 2004 — and the apparently
overdue December elevation of PPP Senator Raza Rabbani as Leader of the
Opposition in parliament’s upper house — as part of an effort by Musharraf to seek
reconciliation with Pakistan’s moderate political parties, perhaps to dilute
international and domestic criticism of his decision to retain dual offices.63  However,
PPP leaders continue to flatly reject an accommodation with the Musharraf
government.
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“Shuffling” of Prime Ministers
At the time of this writing, Pakistan has its third prime minster since the October
2002 elections.  There were in 2004 increasing indications that Musharraf was
unhappy with Prime Minister Jamali’s perceived ineffectiveness and lack of
enthusiasm on key issues such as the NSC and Musharraf’s possible continuation as
Army Chief.64  On June 26, 2004, Jamali announced his resignation at the request of
President Musharraf.  Opposition parties and independent analysts called Jamali’s
“smooth sacking” further evidence of the military’s supreme power.65  Jamali
nominated PML president and Parliament Speaker Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as his
successor.  However, Shujaat’s tenure was meant to be transitional only, as the
person called “Musharraf’s favorite candidate,” Senator and Finance Minister
Shaukat Aziz, was constitutionally obligated to win a seat in the National Assembly
to be eligible for the prime ministership.  After he did so, opposition parties
nominated jailed political figure Javed Hashmi as their candidate for the position.
However, the Assembly Speaker ruled that Hashmi could not attend the vote, and
Aziz won 192 of 342 ballots, with the opposition boycotting the process as “sham
democracy.”66
The choice of Aziz appears to fit with the military’s preference for a “task-
oriented technocrat” who approaches economic development and governance as a
“mechanical process.”67  Aziz’s elevation was seen as being less about the will of the
electorate than about the will of President Musharraf, who is seen as seeking to
secure his grip on the civilian components of his regime by installing a prime
minister who will have little real power over most domestic and international
political matters.68
Musharraf’s Retention of Status as Army Chief
As was noted above, a central complaint of Pakistan’s opposition parties has
been Musharraf’s concurrent standing as both President and Chief of Army Staff, a
circumstance they believe violates the Constitution and perpetuates overt military
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rule.  Despite apparent legal proscriptions set forth in the 17th Amendment,69 and his
own nationally televised promise to resign his commission before January 2005,
there were in 2004 increasing signs that Musharraf would choose to retain dual
offices in what often was described as the “national interest.”  Musharraf’s
lieutenants and party supporters spent months urging him to stay on so as to maintain
“political stability” in Pakistan, and their outspokenness peaked in September 2004.
Among independent observers, such a decision came to be expected and for some
was viewed as an expression of Musharraf’s insecurity.70  The United States
responded by stating that it expected to see continuing progress toward the goal of
“fully functioning democracy” in Pakistan and that it continued to view Musharraf’s
planned military retirement as “progress in this general direction.”71  The British
Commonwealth, which in May 2004 lifted a four-year suspension of Pakistan, had
insisted that Musharraf stand by his pledge to resign from the military or risk further
opprobrium.72
In October 2004, the ruling PML-Q party — ostensibly acting to “bring stability
and ensure a smooth continuation of democracy” — pushed through the National
Assembly a bill that would allow President Musharraf to remain in uniform for the
remainder of his tenure as president.  The move brought waves of criticism from
opposition parties that saw it as yet another undemocratic practice; they disrupted
parliamentary proceedings in protest.  The debate further widened the already
considerable government-opposition rift.73  The United States responded to the
parliamentary act by again expressing the expectation that Pakistan continue
transition to fully functioning democracy and repeating the opinion that Musharraf’s
retirement from the army would be a “good thing,” but was a decision internal to
Musharraf and Pakistan.  When pressed to state whether or not retirement was a
fundamental step toward democracy, a U.S. State Department spokesman would say
only that “steps toward democracy are good and we will continue to urge them.”  A
top British Commonwealth diplomat said the move would be democratic if approved
by Parliament, then “clarified” that it would not meet Commonwealth expectations.74
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In November, the chairman of the Pakistani Senate signed the “dual role” bill into
law as acting president while Musharraf was out of the country.  
In December 2004, Musharraf announced his widely expected decision to retain
his army post in what was described as being the interest of domestic political and
economic stability.  Opposition parties, which Musharraf called “a threat to
democracy,” vowed to launch a national “agitation” in protest of Musharraf’s
continued rule.  Ensuing anti-Musharraf rallies were only modest in size (at least
partly due to inclement weather) and the Pakistan People’s Party declined to enter
into an alliance with the Islamists in the effort.75  Both the Western and Pakistani
press were generally critical of Musharraf’s decision, with some observers expressing
new concerns that the United States is “giving a pass” to Musharraf on nuclear
proliferation and human rights concerns in exchange for Pakistan’s continued
cooperation with U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts.76  
The Bush Administration, which earlier had called Musharraf’s planned
retirement from the military a “good thing” in the context of movement toward
democracy, declined to directly criticize Musharraf’s reversal, but reiterated a U.S.
expectation that Pakistan continue to make progress toward the goal of a “fully
functioning and stable democracy.”77  When Musharraf paid a December visit to
Washington, DC, President Bush expressed his support and lauded the Pakistani
President for “very strong” cooperation with the United States and “focused efforts”
to combat terrorism.  The issues of Pakistani democracy and governance were not
raised during a brief joint press conference held by the leaders, but an unnamed
senior Bush Administration official later insisted that Pakistan’s democratic
institutions were strong and that Musharraf was making them stronger.  Musharraf
told an American television interviewer that “democracy is fully restored” in
Pakistan.  Musharraf later averred that President Bush has never raised the uniform
issue in discussions between the two leaders.78
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The 2005 Municipal Elections
In August 2000, the Musharraf government announced a Local Government
Plan to reinstate elected local governance bodies, with Musharraf saying “genuine
democracy starts from the grassroots upward ...”79  Previous Pakistani military rulers,
beginning with Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, had employed like efforts as part of their
political reforms.  According to one report, “Local governments have proved to be
key instruments in the military’s manipulation of the Pakistani polity to ensure
regime survival.”80  Musharraf’s plan was similar to that of former ruler Gen. Zia in
calling for a three-tiered system at the union, tehsil (town), and zila (district) levels,
each with its own nazim (mayor) and naib (deputy) nazim.  Notably, nazims were
given nominally full administrative autonomy, thus bypassing provincial
governments, and the elections were held on a non-party basis.  The first such polling
took place in early 2001.  While noting that the devolution plan did provide some
benefits —  including greater attention to local needs and more facile public access
to government officials — analysts have been skeptical of the system’s susceptibility
to rigging, a lack of democratic accountability (there is no direct election of district
nazims), and an apparent absence of genuine fiscal and administrative autonomy.
Still, many non-Pakistani observers, especially those from international aid
organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, see the nazim system as a bright
spot in otherwise faltering efforts at Pakistani democratization.81
Although August 2005 municipal elections ostensibly were non-party affairs,
officials from the opposition PPP complained in July that President Musharraf was
violating the code of conduct by urging voters to cast ballots for candidates favored
by the ruling PML-Q.  Then, in a blow to the hopes of Islamist sympathizers, the
Pakistan Supreme Court ruled that candidates with religious education were
ineligible to run in municipal elections unless they have studied English, Pakistan
studies, and Urdu.  Islamist leaders criticized the ruling.82  The voting for candidates
in 110 districts, which came in two phases on August 18 and August 25,  involved
deployment of tens of thousands of troops for security purposes, yet scores of
Pakistanis were killed and as many as 1,000 were injured in poll-related violence
around the country.  Claims of widespread vote-rigging and women being barred
from polling stations in the Frontier Province spurred Pakistan’s major opposition
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parties — both secular and Islamist — to issue a joint call for a national strike to
protest President Musharraf’s “military takeover,” “dictatorial behavior,” and “blatant
rigging.”  Ensuing protests were only moderate in scale (with Quetta being an
exception) and Information Minister Rashid called the strike “a total failure.”83
Candidates favored by Pakistan’s ruling party appear to have fared quite well
in all four provinces, and PML-Q gains were seen as a major boost for President
Musharraf, who may have to rely on the ruling party to win the presidency in 2007.
Musharraf expressed satisfaction with “a victory for the moderates” and “a defeat for
the extremists.”  However, one Pakistani analyst opined that the outcome would be
unlikely to yield political harmony and had only exacerbated the sense of bitterness
and alienation felt among opposition parties.  Others warn that apparent irregularities
could in fact harm Musharraf’s image; a former Pakistani ambassador called the
process a “typically vice-regal electoral exercise.”84
Human Rights
In February 2005, the U.S. State Department released its annual Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, which found that the Pakistan government’s
human rights record in 2004 “remained poor.”  The discussion of Pakistan, authored
by State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, does not contain the
words “democracy” or “democratic,” and notes that the right of citizens to change
their government “was restricted in practice.”  A March 2005 State Department
report on human rights and democracy claimed that Pakistan’s political parties “are
generally weak, undemocratic institutions centered on personalities instead of
policies.  The judiciary is corrupt, inefficient, and malleable to political pressure.”
In May 2005, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom released an
annual report claiming that, “The response of the government of Pakistan to
persistent and religiously motivated violence in Pakistan continues to be inadequate”
and again recommending Pakistan be designated a Country of Particular Concern.
Islamabad rejects U.S. criticism of its human rights record, saying that “no country
is perfect” and insisting that efforts are underway to improve the situation.85
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Numerous independent observers identify major ongoing problems with
Pakistan’s human rights situation in general and lack of full democracy in particular.
In its Freedom in the World 2005 report, and for the sixth consecutive year, the often-
cited Freedom House rated Pakistan as “not free” in the areas of political rights and
civil liberties.  Human rights groups have issued reports critical of the military-
dominated Musharraf government for its “violent repression” of opposition political
rallies, for protecting its “grip” on the country’s economic resources, especially land,
and for using Pakistan’s role in the “war on terrorism” to maintain an oppressive,
nondemocratic hold on national power.  A coalition of Western human rights groups
has chided the United States for providing military aid to “states carrying out
persistent human rights violations,” including Pakistan.  Pakistan’s leading human
rights organization holds the government responsible for increasing violations of
basic human rights and for failing to maintain law and order in the country.86
Other developments in 2005 spurred Pakistan’s secular opposition parties and
independent human rights groups to accuse the Islamabad government of taking
actions that contradict President Musharraf’s stated policy of “enlightened
moderation.”  For example, in March, ruling party parliamentarians allied with
Islamists to reject legislation which sought to strengthen national laws against “honor
killings” (the murder of women determined to have shamed themselves and their
families).  Prime Minister Aziz’s cabinet later called for a restoration of a religious
column on Pakistani passports, thus reversing an earlier decision to remove the
column (Islamist politicians had launched a campaign to protest the government’s
decision to exclude the column).87
In April, police in the eastern city of Gujranwala clashed with Islamist protestors
opposed to women’s participation in a foot race there.  Some 900 Islamist party
supporters, reportedly bused into the area from the North West Frontier Province, had
attacked race participants with batons, Molotov cocktails, and other weapons.  When
a group of human rights activists later staged another “mixed marathon” including
both men and women in Lahore, police used force to disperse them, and a former
chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan was among those
“brutally dragged” into police vans and detained for several hours.  Some Pakistani
observers saw in the government’s actions further evidence that the Islamist parties
CRS-25
88 “Clashes Over Pakistan Road Race,” BBC News, Apr. 3, 2005; “Pakistan Police Brutality
Claim,” BBC News, May 14, 2005; “Police Mark World Press Freedom Day by Arresting
and Beating Journalists,” Azmat Abbas, “Enlightened Retreat,” Herald (Karachi), May
2005.
89 Reporters Without Borders Press Release, May 4, 2005.
90 “Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State Washington File, June 15, 2005;
“Pakistan President Says He Imposed Travel Ban on Well-Known Rape Victim,” Associated
Press, June 17, 2005; “With Friends Like This ...” (editorial), New York Times, June 15,
2005; Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Pakistan’s Gang Rape PR Disaster,” BBC News, June 17,
2005; Najam Sethi, “Mukthar Mai’s ‘Strength and Resilience Not For Export,’” Friday
Times (Lahore), June 17, 2005.
91 “Outrage Over Musharraf Rape Remarks,” BBC News, Sep. 16, 2005
92 International Foundation for Election Systems, “National Public Opinion Survey Pakistan
2004,” available at [http://www.plsc.org.pk/survey/index.htm].  Still, Americans are not the
(continued...)
are able to exert great influence on Islamabad.88  Also in May, police in Islamabad
and Lahore used batons to break up gatherings of journalists marking World Press
Freedom Day, injuring nine and detaining 30 more.  The arrests came hours after
Pakistan’s information minister told a seminar that the media were free in Pakistan.89
The treatment of women in Pakistan has been scrutinized in 2005.  During the
House hearing, Secretary Rocca expressed dismay at travel restrictions placed on
Pakistani gang rape victim Mukhtaran Mai, a woman gang-raped at the order of a
tribal council as punishment for relatively minor alleged trespasses by her younger
brother.  A State Department spokesman later said, “The United States expects
Pakistan’s leaders to honor their pledge to protect the basic human rights of their
citizens, including freedom to travel.”  President Musharraf reportedly said he had
imposed travel restrictions on Mai to protect Pakistan’s image from Western
nongovernmental organizations which are “as bad as the Islamic extremists.”  A New
York Times editorial chided Musharraf for his handling of the case, which BBC News
later called “a public relations disaster” and a leading Pakistani commentator called
“a monumental blunder.”90  Facing criticism over this and other high-profile rape
cases in his country, Musharraf came to the U.N. General Assembly gathering in
New York in September 2005 with repairing Pakistan’s image as one of his stated
goals.  However, his reported comment that rape in Pakistan was a “money-making
concern” brought waves of criticism from both Western and Pakistani civil rights
groups.91
Islamization and Anti-American Sentiment
Adding to U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s domestic political developments are
signs of “Islamization” and anti-American sentiment there.  Pakistanis are a pious
people, many or most of whom are unlikely to want separation between Islam and
governance:  A 2004 survey found nearly two-thirds of citizens saying “religion
should play a paramount role in politics” and only 6% seeing no role for religion in
politics.92  In June 2003, the Islamist coalition in the conservative North West
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Frontier Province passed a Shariat bill in the provincial assembly, and the
government of Baluchistan later established an Islamist legal council.  In July 2005,
the NWFP assembly passed a “Hasba” (accountability) bill that many fear will create
a parallel Islamic legal body and be harmful to human rights.  These efforts may seek
to replicate in Pakistan the harsh enforcement of Islamic law seen in Afghanistan
under the Taliban.  Such developments alarm Pakistan’s moderates and likely elicited
President Musharraf’s August 2003 vow to “finish off religious extremism” (a vow
repeated in July 2005).93  In August 2005, following a request from Musharraf that
it reject the “Hasba” provisions, the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled that the
controversial  bill contained several unconstitutional clauses and blocked its
implementation.    
Pakistan’s Islamists routinely denounce Pakistani military operations in western
tribal areas, resist government attempts to reform religious schools that teach
militancy, and harshly criticize Islamabad’s cooperation with the U.S. government.
One senior MMA leader went so far as to suggest that Western governments may
have “engineered” the 7/7 London bombings.94  Most analysts contend that two
December 2003 attempts to assassinate President Musharraf were carried out by
Islamic militants angered by Pakistan’s post-September 2001 policy shift.  Yet
Islamists’ political influence in Pakistan’s two western provinces is viewed by many
as contingent upon the MMA’s continued basic acceptance of the current political
system.  This leads some to a conclusion that the Islamists — and Fazlur Rehman’s
JUI-F, in particular — will not push against the Musharraf regime so far as to lose
their own standing.  By emitting a consistent message with little regard for the
potential to offend Pakistani government or foreign officials, the Islamists’ issues
resonate with the conservative, anti-Western sentiments of many Pakistanis.  MMA
power at the polling booth, however, continues to be limited.95
Anti-American sentiment among Pakistani citizens is not limited to Islamic
groups:  A July 2005 Pew Center opinion poll found 51% of Pakistanis expressing
confidence in Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden to “do the right thing in world
affairs.”  An earlier Pew survey found only 6% of Pakistanis believing the United
States was sincere in its efforts to combat terrorism; about half viewed the United
States as seeking to “dominate the world.”  The Pakistani army, which was
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significantly radicalized by Gen. Zia’s policies in the 1980s, continues to be home
to Muslim hardliners at the middle and lower ranks.  In 2004 testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one senior expert opined that “Pakistan is
probably the most anti-American country in the world right now, ranging from the
radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernized elites on the other side.”
Support for this claim came from a June 2005 opinion poll which found 23% of
Pakistanis expressing a favorable view of the United States, the lowest percentage
for any country surveyed.96
The leadership of the MMA’s two main constituents — the Jamaat-i-Islami’s
(JI) Qazi Hussein Ahmed and the Jamiat-Ulema-Islami (JUI)-Fazlur’s Maulana
Fazlur Rehman — are notable for their sometimes virulent anti-American rhetoric;
they have at times called for “jihad” against what they view as the existential threat
to Pakistani sovereignty that alliance with Washington entails.97  In addition to
decrying and seeking to end President Musharraf’s cooperation with the United
States, many clerics also are viewed as opposing the U.S.-supported Kabul
government.  Despite their sometimes grating rhetoric, Pakistan’s Islamists have
benefitted greatly from Musharraf’s undermining of the country’s mainstream parties,
and today the MMA can be considered a fairly cohesive political force that continues
to present a serious challenge to Musharraf’s policies of moderation.98  Musharraf
repeatedly has called on Pakistan’s Muslim clerics to assist in fighting extremism and
improving Pakistan’s image as a moderate and progressive state.99
Legislation and Issues for Congress
U.S. Aid and Aid Restrictions
Pakistan is among the world’s top recipients of U.S. assistance, with more than
$2.6 billion in U.S. aid allocated for FY2002-FY2005, including about $1.1 billion
for security-related programs.  In June 2003, President Bush hosted President
Musharraf at Camp David, Maryland, where he pledged to work with Congress on
establishing a five-year, $3 billion aid package for Pakistan to cover FY2005-
FY2009.  General Musharraf’s extra-constitutional seizure of power in October 1999
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triggered penalties under Section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations
act, which bans non-humanitarian U.S. assistance “to any country whose duly elected
head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.”100  In October 2001 (P.L.
107-57), Congress waived coup-related aid restrictions for FY2002 and granted the
President waiver authority for FY2003.  President Bush exercised this in March
2003.  A November 2003 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 108-106)
included a provision extending the President’s waiver authority through FY2004; this
was exercised in March 2004.  In December 2004, Congress extended the President’s
waiver authority through FY2006 with the passage the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).101  Pending legislation in the 109th
Congress (the Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005, S. 12) includes
Pakistan-specific language regarding “a number of critical issues that threaten to
disrupt” U.S.-Pakistan relations.  Government institutions, democracy, and rule of
law are among these.
Since August 2003, Pakistan and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) have been cooperating on a five-year grant program to
support more participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Pakistan.
Six “good governance” projects have been funded with more than $32 million to
date; the total over five years is expected to roughly double that amount.  Three
programs — Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance in
Pakistan, Support Democratic Local Government and Decentralization, and Improve
Justice Sector/Legal Framework — account for the great majority of budgeted funds.
According to USAID, the projects aim to support Pakistan’s progress toward more
democratic, responsive, and transparent governance by helping to strengthen
legislative bodies, political parties, and civil society.102
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Sources:  U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development.
Notes:  FY2005 amounts are estimates; FY2006 amounts are requested.  FY2005 amounts include
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Succession Issues
An acute concern of many U.S. policymakers is the issue of political succession
in Pakistan, especially as it relates to potential domestic upheaval and control of that
country’s nuclear arsenal.103  The constitutionally designated successor to the
President is the Chairman of the Senate, currently  PML-Q member and Musharraf
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, 
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loyalist Muhammadmian Soomro, an international banker from a well-known Sindhi
family.  It is the President’s prerogative to appoint Army Chiefs.  The consensus view
among analysts has the Pakistani military maintaining its substantive administration
of the country in the event of President Musharraf’s premature removal.  The nature
of such a potential removal likely would influence the scope and intensity of military
governance.  For example, if Musharraf were removed through violent means, it is
quite possible that the army would declare martial law and rule directly for a period.
In any case, it is widely assumed that the hierarchical solidarity and historic
professionalism of Pakistan’s military would result in its continued effectiveness as
a stabilizing force, at least in the short- and perhaps middle-term.  Despite the
apparent sturdiness of the military’s command structure, there remains widespread
pessimism about the ability of political institutions built by Musharraf to survive his
sudden removal, and so doubts remain about the viability of political succession
mechanisms.  Moreover, it is not clear that Musharraf’s successor would carry on his
strongly pro-U.S. policies:  in March 2005, Defense Intelligence Director Jacoby told
a Senate Armed Services Committee panel, “If Musharraf were assassinated or
otherwise replaced, Pakistan’s leader would be less pro-U.S.”104
After his September 2001 policy shift, Musharraf moved to purge pro-Taliban
Islamists from the higher ranks of the military.  Vice-Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
Gen. Mohammed Yusuf, a moderate, was seen as the most likely successor to the
position of COAS, although some observers identified the Chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Mohammad Aziz, as a contender.  While considered
fully loyal to the army, of Pakistan’s 30 highest-ranking officers, Gen. Aziz may have
been the only remaining officer with meaningful links to Islamist groups.105  Both
Gen. Yusuf and Gen. Aziz retired in October 2004.  President Musharraf named two
close allies to replace them:  Lt. Gen. Ahsan Salim Hayat, the Karachi Corps
Commander, is the new Vice-COAS and the senior-most army officer after
Musharraf; ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, a moderate who oversaw the removal
of pro-Taliban officers from Pakistan’s intelligence service after September 2001,
was appointed Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Committee.  Gen. Hayat
narrowly escaped assassination in a bloody June 2004 attack on his motorcade, an
event that appeared to confirm his status as an enemy of Islamic extremists.  The
newly promoted four-star general is believed to be one of Musharraf’s closest allies
in the military and his most likely successor as Army Chief.106
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Outlook and Policy Options
Outlook.  There continues to be few signs that the government of President
Musharraf and its supporters in parliament and the military will move to relinquish
power before scheduled 2007 general elections.  A continuing lack of unity among
opposition groups remains a serious constraint on their ability to pressure the
Musharraf-led government.  Beyond obvious differences over the role religion should
play in Pakistan’s governance, the MMA and the ARD find themselves with
opposing views on such sensitive issues as proposed amendments to the controversial
blasphemy law and Hudood Ordinances (related to women’s rights), both of which
are criticized as unjust and oppressive by human rights groups, but which are
considered sacrosanct by the Islamists.  Some analysts identify less obvious factors
behind opposition disunity, including an active campaign of “divide-and-rule” by the
military, and previous hints of an accommodation between Musharraf and the ARD
have not panned out.  There are, however, signs that a below-board accommodation
between the Pakistani military and the Islamist parties is disintegrating.107
Pakistan’s unstable and even deteriorating domestic security circumstances —
seen in still tense relations with Pashtun tribesmen in border regions near
Afghanistan, and continuing sectarian violence and Islamic militancy in urban centers
— can have the effect of improving the army’s standing among some sectors of the
Pakistani public.  One U.S. scholar suggests that criticism of Pakistan’s apparently
slow movement toward democracy is arbitrary and ignores the potential cost to U.S.
policy interests that faster movement might entail.  Such cost could include a more
constrained Pakistani military and political leaders in Islamabad whose greater
responsiveness to public opinion might mean reduced cooperation with the United
States.108  However, and as noted above, this view is disputed by numerous observers
who insist that the strengthening of Pakistan’s democratic institutions and civil
society is itself a fundamental requirement for the creation of a stable and prosperous
Pakistani state.109
Pakistan has come a long way since the 1990s, when “potential failed state” was
not an unusual label for this important country.  During President Musharraf’s tenure,
Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators are greatly improved and relations with India
have warmed.  The country’s international standing is at least partially rehabilitated,
especially with the government’s status as a key member of the international anti-
terrorism coalition.  Even some of Musharraf’s most vocal critics have acknowledged
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the concrete benefits of his leadership.110  Yet, despite the potentially brightened
prospects for future civilian governance in Pakistan, military rule substantively
continues, and most analysts foresee little or no power being transferred to the
country’s civilian political leaders in the near- and middle-term.
When, in May 2005, Musharraf declared his intention to seek to remain in office
beyond 2007, many analysts saw him following a nondemocratic path similar to that
taken by previous Pakistani military rulers.  In the same month, a senior Pakistani
journalist and editor declared on behalf of his staff, “We are tired of pious lectures
on democracy and constitutionalism” from officials who pursue neither with
sincerity.  In addition, fewer and fewer independent onlookers find Musharraf’s
repeated pledges to defeat Pakistani religious extremism as anything more than
“rounding up the usual suspects.”111  Pakistan’s foreign and defense ministers have
issued separate assurances that President Musharraf will contest 2007 elections as a
civilian, but Musharraf himself has not ruled out remaining in uniform beyond
2007.112  So long as the military continues to exert preeminent control over Pakistan’s
governance — and Islamist forces continue to succeed in blocking efforts to alter
controversial civil laws and reform religious schools — there will be doubt cast on
Musharraf’s claims to be pursuing a policy of “enlightened moderation.”
Policy Options.  U.S. policy options regarding Pakistan’s governance system
and civil society can be seen to fall into four broad categories: status quo, increased
pressure, increased incentives, and adjusting emphases of current aid programs.
Some of the policies could be employed in tandem.
! Status quo:  At present, the United States provides large-scale
assistance to Pakistan under annual waivers of coup-related
sanctions granted by Congress and exercised by the President.  The
Bush Administration has not issued  strong public criticisms of
Pakistan’s apparently halting process of democratization while still
encouraging movement toward establishment of full democracy.  No
conditions have been placed on U.S. aid to Pakistan.  A continuation
of this policy would seek to prod Pakistan’s power brokers in the
military to create circumstances in which fully free and fair national
and provincial elections could take place in 2007, at which point the
U.S. President might be in a position to determine that Pakistani
democracy had been restored and Section 508 aid restrictions could
permanently be removed.  Continued marginalization of Pakistan’s
moderate opposition parties and controversy over reported
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irregularities in August 2005 municipal polls fuel skepticism that
status quo policies are effective.
! Increased Pressure:  The United States has several options that
would seek to increase pressure on the Pakistan government so as to
spur more full and rapid movement on democratization in Pakistan.
These include ending or reducing U.S. aid  and/or placing conditions
on continued U.S. aid, for instance by setting democracy-related
benchmarks.  Ending or reducing assistance to a Major Non-NATO
Ally at a time when Pakistan plays a key role in U.S.-led anti-
terrorism efforts is likely to be counterproductive in the context of
broader U.S. interests, some say, and sanctions in the recent past
resulted in greatly reduced U.S. influence in Islamabad and little
success in attaining U.S. objectives.  There are those who argue,
however, that without conditionality on U.S. aid, the Pakistani
military will have little motivation to fully remove itself from
Pakistan’s governance.
! Increased Incentives:  Another option for U.S. policy would
involve offering additional aid to Pakistan linked to that country’s
progress with its domestic reform agenda (and perhaps also with its
cooperation in counterterrorism and nonproliferation).  Such
incentives could be for the benefit of the country generally or for the
military in particular (many saw the March 2005 decision by
President Bush to resume F-16 sales to Pakistan as a “reward” for
the Musharraf government’s cooperation on counterterrorism).  For
example, the future sale of major U.S. weapons platforms to
Pakistan could be offered as a “bonus” that would follow successful
implementation of full democracy in Islamabad or, short of that, for
certain substantive actions on the path to that goal (e.g., the return to
Pakistan of exiled opposition figures).  This form of positive
reenforcement could be employed in tandem with a policy of
negative conditionality noted above.
! Adjusting Emphases of Current Aid Programs:  President Bush’s
2005-2009 aid plan for Pakistan calls for a 50-50 split of funds for
economics and funds for military financing.  A policy of continuing
current aid allocations while emphasizing economic aid over
military aid — a policy recommended by a Council on Foreign
Relations and the Asia Society taskforce113 — could serve to more
effectively bolster Pakistan’s social and economic development, and
could quicken the pace of democratization and education reform
there.  Skeptics of this approach emphasize that ongoing security
threats, especially as related to instability in neighboring
Afghanistan, require ensuring that Pakistan’s military feels secure
and well-equipped.
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Given Pakistan’s strategic setting, large Muslim population, experience with
religious extremism, weapons proliferation activities, and historical involvement in
regional conflict, the level of stability and quality of governance there are likely to
remain of keen interest to most U.S. policymakers.
